Mind-Body Supervenience

2006-05-27T05:55:00.000-07:00

The Mind-Body Supervenience thesis says “there are no difference in mental states without difference in physical states” and we can formalize it like this:
['»' = condictional]

1. (ment. difference) » (phys. difference)

2. tollens: -( phys. difference) » -( ment. difference)

3. (phys. identity) » (ment. identity)

Is fundamental to understand that in this thesis the sameness of mental states doesn’t implicate physic states sameness. The Supervenience thesis is obviously a non-reductionist position. Moreover, the fact of requiring that the mental state sameness is not a sufficient condition for the physical state sameness is of course a way to avoid the consequences of reductionism, e.g., the identity between mental states and physical states. And, in which cases the mental state sameness doesn’t implicate the physical state sameness?
Kim proposes the next example (Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind 1998: 11). Let´s suppose the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent beings, whose organisms have a physiological basis different of ours (e.g. the basis isn’t carbon), but that they have the same psychological capacities. I think it’s not a pretty convincent example.

Kim affirm later that one of the consequences of the Supervenience Thesis is the posibility of only one cartesian soul. Why have we to deduce the existence of no more than one cartesian soul? According to Kim, because of the next reason. Let’s suppose that there are two cartesian souls and that they of course haven’t physical properties. According to this, their physical properties are indistinguishable: there is no criterion to affirm that there exists any difference between them. Therefore (2.), these souls haven’t differences in their mental states, neither.

Q . MIND

Mind-Body Supervenience